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Executive Summary 
This MeCoDEM working paper presents an overview of the main findings from a 
quantitative content analysis covering different types of democratisation conflicts (i.e., 
conflicts over citizenship, elections, transitional justice and distribution of power) in four 
countries: Egypt, Kenya, Serbia and South Africa. The sample involves 5162 newspaper 
articles and news stories in the four countries selected on the basis of two main criteria: the 
degree of independence of media outlets from government and political parties, and their 
relevance. The key findings from the content analysis are organised around several themes: 
causes of democratisation conflicts, portrayal of conflict parties, preferred solutions to 
conflicts, perceptions of democracy, role of the media, authoritarian past, and tone of 
reporting and polarisation. 
Although this paper focuses principally on description, we also speculate about the 
main factors that shape similarities and differences in media coverage of democratisation 
conflicts. The main finding from the content analysis is that cross-national variations that we 
found in media reporting of democratisation conflicts appear to depend on several factors: 
x Our data strongly reflect specific country contexts (and contexts of broader regions from 
which they come from, including the Arab Middle East, sub-Saharan Africa and post-
communist Europe) to be a consistent factor that shapes the pattern of media coverage, 
reflecting the close interdependence between media and politics. Historical and 
geographical influences crystallise over time into specific political, institutional and 
cultural legacies and thus shape media framing in different ways. For example, the army 
is perceived as a relevant political institution in Egypt (and much of the Middle East) ± 
due to its dominant role in politics since independence from colonial rule ± but not in 
other countries. However, the relationship between country context and media coverage 
is not a simple 1:1 reflection and multiple transformations of meaning in public discourses 
can tilt interpretations of political events toward unexpected directions.  
x Regime type and the stage of democratisation matter when it comes to media framing of 
political conflicts because press freedom is an important aspect of democracy. As a 
result, countries that feature similar levels of democracy, or find themselves at similar 
points in democratisation, cluster together on several (but not all) relevant variables. 
$FURVV DOO IRXU FRXQWULHV PHGLD¶V SRUWUD\DOV RI WKH DFKLHYHPHQWV RI GHPRFUDF\ GLIIHU
considerably with the most negative reporting recorded in South Africa and the most 
positive in Serbia. This finding is puzzling because these two countries can be seen as 
the two most advanced democracies in our sample. Factors that contribute to a positive 
evaluation of democracy are peaceful elections, the rule of law and economic growth, 
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whereas institutional deficiencies, social inequalities and limited citizenship undermine 
beliefs in democratic governance. 
x In addition, media reporting also varied depending on types of democratisation conflict ± 
which reflect the main arenas of political contestation ± though less so than on country 
contexts. Our data show that elections, as a highly institutionalised type of conflict 
(though it also probably depends on regime type/situation), were covered somewhat 
differently than other conflict types. Across all countries, the quality of media coverage is 
limited by bias, emotionalisation and ± most importantly ± polarisation.  
In particular, conflicts over the control of power trigger sharp polarisation, whereas 
elections ± contrary to existing literature ± seem to force media towards a more restrained 
style of reporting. Further research, which draws on other sources, including the qualitative 
analysis of media content, interviews with journalists, civil society and political actors, as well 
as document analysis, is required to explain how exactly and why all these factors shape 
media coverage of democratisation conflicts. 
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Introduction 
Democratisation involves far-reaching re-configurations of power structures, value 
systems and resources and thus triggers conflicts between reformers and those who 
benefited from the old regime and are attached to its values. In these periods of political and 
social transformation the media are playing a crucial role as a space where democratisation 
conflicts are played out. But the media are also active participants with their own interests, 
preferences and world views.  
&RPPXQLFDWLRQVFKRODUVKDYHSRLQWHGRXWWKDWWKHPHGLD¶VUROHLVQRWFRQILQHGWRMXVW
mirroring what is going on. Instead, they provide a particular interpretation of reality (Bennett 
2005). They do so by selecting events and topics while neglecting others, by providing or 
denying access to actors and by taking sides in ongoing conflicts and debates. In particular, 
WKH PHGLD¶V FDSDFLW\ WR IUDPH SROLWLFDO LVVXHV DQG HYHQWV KDV EHHQ VKRZQ WR KDYe the 
SRWHQWLDOWRGLUHFWSHRSOH¶VSHUFHSWLRQVRIUHDOLW\DQGE\FRQVHTXHQFHWKHLUDFWLRQVVHHIRU
an overview Vladisavljevic 2015). 
The project Media, Conflict and Democratisation (MeCoDEM) sets out to 
V\VWHPDWLFDOO\ LQYHVWLJDWH WKHPHGLD¶VUROH LQGHPRcratisation conflicts. This paper presents 
an overview of the main findings from a quantitative content analysis covering 
democratisation conflicts in four countries: Egypt, Kenya, Serbia and South Africa. The aim 
of this paper is to identify similarities and differences in the way in which the media in these 
four countries reported on and framed these events. Within the limitations of this paper, we 
can only offer initial explanations of the factors that have shaped such media coverage and 
briefly reflect on the consequences this might have on the dynamics and outcomes of 
democratisation conflicts. More comprehensive analyses that incorporate a broader range of 
data from interviews with journalists, civil society and political elites will follow as the project 
progresses. 
The paper consists of the following sections: the first provides an introduction to the 
four country contexts, different types of democratisation conflicts, and the conflict cases that 
were selected for the MeCoDEM research programme. It also outlines hypotheses about 
factors that are most likely to shape media coverage of conflicts in transitions from 
authoritarian rule and in new democracies. The second section discusses methodological 
issues, including principles of quantitative media content analysis, research instrument, 
sampling and coding procedures. The main part of the paper then presents and discusses 
the key findings from the content analysis. These are organised around several themes: 
causes of democratisation conflicts, portrayal of conflict parties, preferred solutions to 
conflicts, perceptions of democracy, role of the media, authoritarian past, and tone of 
reporting and polarisation. Finally, the conclusion brings all these threads together. 
 
Democratisation conflicts in four countries 
The MeCoDEM project explores the contentious dimensions of democratisation by 
focusing on selected democratisation conflicts in Egypt, Kenya, Serbia and South Africa. The 
four countries are selected because they provide a diverse set of political contexts with 
regard to democratic development. Egypt is an example of a (so far) failed attempt at 
democratisation that involved a broad popular uprising against a personalist rule, sharp 
polarisation between secular elites and the military on the one hand, and popularly-based 
Islamist parties on the other hand, culminating in a violent military crackdown. Kenya 
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represents a post-colonial emerging democracy that carries with it various deep social 
cleavages, such as ethnic divisions, which often translate into political conflict and, 
RFFDVLRQDOO\ YLROHQFH 7KH OHJDF\ RI <XJRVODYLD¶V EUHDNGRZQ DQG VXEVHTXHQW YLROHQW
FRQIOLFWV DV ZHOO DV WKDW RI SHUVRQDOLVW DXWKRULWDULDQ UXOH KDV VWURQJO\ VKDSHG 6HUELD¶V
democracy, which remains marred with clientelism, corruption and unresolved issues of 
national identity. South Africa has more experience with democracy than other selected 
countries, but is suffering from the legacy of social inequality, corruption and restricted 
citizenship rights, resulting in growing popular discontent and protests (for a detailed 
discussion of the research design of MeCoDEM see Voltmer and Kraetzschmar 2015: 12-
13). 
We opted for an issue-based (as opposed to actor-based) approach in the study of 
democratisation conflicts since it facilitates a close, thematic exploration of the links between 
conflict and democratisation in very different contexts. Several types of conflict are relevant 
in this respect. Democratisation involves conflicts over the distribution and control of power, 
which include old and new elites and broader groups in the shaping of a new political order. 
Likewise, conflicts over different conceptions of citizenship emerge after authoritarianism 
since previously marginalised groups demand citizenship rights. Election campaigns in 
democratising regimes often revive and reshape existing social divisions and conflicts, not 
least in the zero-sum fashion, which boosts polarisation, and may sometimes facilitate 
violence. Another form of democratisation conflict relates to the legacy of repression and 
violence produced by prior regimes and involves struggles over the accountability of old 
elites and broader issues of how to deal with the authoritarian past, that is, over transitional 
justice (see Voltmer and Kraetzschmar 2015: 17-24). Table 1 lists the democratisation 
conflicts that we explored in the content analysis. 
Table 1: Selected conflict cases 
Country Citizenship (rights, 
minorities, identity) 
Distribution of 
power 
Elections Transitional 
justice  
Egypt Christian-Muslim 
violence (2013)  
Maspero incident 
(2011) 
Presidential election 
(2012) 
 
Kenya Somali community/ 
.HQ\D¶VµZDURQ
WHUURU¶-2014) 
 Presidential election 
(2007) 
Presidential election 
(2013) 
 
 
(also includes 
ICC prosecution 
of Kenyatta) 
Serbia* Pride Parade (2010) Ombudsman 
(2015) 
Parliamentary election 
(2008) (EU 
LQWHJUDWLRQ.RVRYR¶V
secession) 
Transitional 
justice/Arrest and 
extradition of 
0LORãHYLüWRWKH
ICTY (2001) 
South Africa Xenophobic attacks 
(2008, 2015) 
Service delivery 
protests (2009, 
2010, 2013, 2014) 
State of the Nation 
Address (2015) 
  
* We selected three conflicts per country, except for Serbia which includes four. The case of a 
government-initiated smear media campaign against the ombudsman, which occurred after empirical 
research had already started, was added later as highly relevant to understanding the role of media in 
democratisation in Serbia. 
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Although this paper focuses principally on description, we also speculate about the 
main factors that shape similarities and differences in media coverage of democratisation 
conflicts. Several hypotheses are built into the very foundations of the MeCoDEM research 
project, especially its selection of cases. In fact, the selected countries and conflicts serve as 
proxies for diverse political contexts along the criteria of history, institutions and culture, type 
of democratisation conflict, regime type and stage of democratisation, which thus reflect the 
main hypotheses. 
Firstly, historical and geographical influences crystallise over time into specific 
political, institutional and cultural legacies that tend to differ across countries and across 
world regions. We expect that media reporting will differ in Egypt, Kenya, Serbia and South 
Africa; reflecting their specific historical experiences and/or legacies of such a diverse set of 
regions they come from, including the Arab Middle East, sub-Saharan Africa and post-
FRPPXQLVW (XURSH HVSHFLDOO\ ZLWK UHVSHFW WR SHUFHSWLRQV RI FRQIOLFWV¶ FDXVHV SURSRVHG
remedies, perceptions of democracy and instrumentalisation of the past. Secondly, we 
anticipate that the types of democratisation conflict, which reflect the main arenas of political 
contestation, will shape media reporting in different ways, not only with regard to causes of 
democratisation conflicts, but also preferred solutions, the role of the media and tone of 
reporting. For example, media coverage tends to be more biased, emotional and polarised 
during election campaigns than in the reporting of other issues. 
Thirdly, regime type is significant because press freedom is an important aspect of 
democracy. As a result, media reporting should differ in more and less democratic states. We 
expect that media will cover democratisation conflicts differently in South Africa and Serbia ± 
as more advanced in democratic development ± than in Egypt DQG .HQ\D 9ODGLVDYOMHYLü
2015). Fourthly, media tend to report on conflicts differently depending on the stage of 
democratisation. One possibility is that media coverage of politics is more confrontational in 
early stages of democratisation, as media try to compensate for decades of political control 
and subdued reporting, and gets more restrained over time as new democratic institutions 
consolidate. Alternatively, media remain dependent on key power centres in the wake of 
regime change, or take pains not to undermine a new democratic government at a time of 
uncertainty, and start demanding accountability from the main political actors only in the 
subsequent years VHH 9ODGLVDYOMHYLü  2QH KDV WR EHDU LQ PLQG KRZHYHU WKDW
influences that originate from long-standing political, institutional and cultural legacies and 
those emerging from more immediate political factors, such as those related to regime type 
and stage of democratisation, overlap to some extent and/or may work in opposite directions. 
 
Method: content analysis 
How news media frame key issues and actors during and after transitions from 
authoritarian rule has a major impact on the emergence, dynamics and outcomes of political 
conflicts. To learn more about media coverage of these conflicts, we employ a method that 
produces a detailed description of media reporting. Content analysis is the systematic and 
quantitative analysis of message characteristics. When related to media coverage, content 
analysis aims to describe its main patterns accurately by examining the manifest content of 
reporting. The focus on manifest elements of the text requires detachment from any 
LQWHUSUHWDWLRQV RU µUHDGLQJ EHWZHHQ WKH OLQHV¶ GXULQJ WKH SURFHVV RI GDWD FROOHFWLRQ
Quantitative content analysis typically singles out those characteristics of reporting that are 
important for a specific research project, while largely disregarding other features of the 
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reporting. In other words, the resulting data set reflects selected features of the textual 
material, but does not represent the text in its entirety. It is widely regarded as problematic to 
draw inferences from the content to social processes outside the text, in particular to any 
effects on audiences or the wider society (see Neuendorf 2002; Krippendorff 2004). Other 
research methods employed in the course of the MeCoDEM project are designed to probe 
questions about causes and consequences of media reporting, including those that shed 
light on factors that shape journalistic practice and the media strategies of various political 
actors, and on various contextual factors (see Lohner et al. 2016; Pointer et al. 2016). 
Therefore, the quantitative content analysis in the MeCoDEM project identifies and 
describes the main features of media representations of conflicts during and after transitions 
from authoritarian rule in Egypt, Kenya, Serbia and South Africa. As a result, we can 
compare and contrast data about conflict communication from the four countries and from 
different types of democratisation conflicts (i.e., conflicts over citizenship, elections, 
transitional justice and distribution of power). 
The
 codebook or the content analysis protocol lies at the centre of quantitative 
content analysis. It specifies how selected variables should be measured and recorded. It 
builds upon key concepts that are the foundations of the research project, in our case drawn 
from democratisation studies, communication research, various strands of conflict studies 
DQGIURPJHQHUDOSROLWLFDODQGVRFLDOVFLHQFHUHVHDUFK(QWPDQ¶VGHILQLWLRQRIWKHNH\DVSHFWV
of framing (1993) provides a useful organising device for the investigation of media reporting 
on conflicts in transitions from authoritarian rule and in new democracies. From this 
perspective, key puzzles explored are (1) how the media define problems at the centre of 
democratisation conflicts, (2) what are the causes and instigators of the conflicts they identify 
in the process, (3) how the media coverage evaluates the problems, and (4) what solutions 
the media prescribe for the conflicts.  
The unit of analysis is the newspaper article or the news story within a television 
programme. We defined a newspaper article by layout (i.e., headline, confined story of 
various length) and a news story by topic introduced by a newsreader or presenter (e.g., 
includes read-out text, live report, various quotes from interviews). Another news story 
begins when the coverage returns to the newsreader or presenter, or if a different journalist 
presents a report. As a result, sometimes there are several news stories on the same topic 
within one news programme, which are coded separately (for a more detailed description of 
the research instrument, including the codebook, see 9ODGLVDYOMHYLü 
 
Coder training and inter-coder reliability 
The codebook was piloted on a sample of newspaper articles and news stories 
across all conflicts in the four countries. Coder teams ± employed and trained by country 
team leaders ± consisted principally of post-graduate students from local institutions. Coding 
was conducted in English in South Africa and Kenya but in Arabic in Egypt and in Serbian in 
Serbia. The content analysis protocol was prepared in English, so we used bilingual coders, 
who were fluent in English (the project language) and in Arabic and Serbian respectively. 
None of the local teams had prior training in quantitative content analysis. Therefore, 
coders were trained over several months to guarantee a high quality of data. The training 
involved regular meetings to discuss the main concepts, how they are operationalised and 
applied to the coding of specific news material. These discussions took place both among 
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country team members and between country teams to ensure consistency across the whole 
project. 
To monitor the quality of coding, inter-coder reliability tests were conducted in all four 
country teams, each comprising at least 40 randomly selected news stories per country 
team. Table 2 gives an overview of the level of reliability, broken down for individual country 
teams. 
Table 2: Inter-coder reliability 
 
Nominal variablesa) Ordinal variablesb) 
Egypt 0.88 0.73 
Kenya 0.79 0.52 
Serbia 0.94 0.84 
South Africa 0.85 0.65 
All 0.86 0.69 
a) Percentage agreement 
b) 6SHDUPDQ¶VUKR 
 
Overall, the level of reliability across coders is acceptable to excellent. Apparently, 
coders had more problems with ordinal variables (we used 5-point scales for measuring 
degrees of various qualities), than with nominal variables that identify categories of objects. 
Variations in the level of reliability achieved across countries also reflect the different levels 
of research capacity provided in the academic institutions of the four countries. 
We used SPSS ± a statistics software package that is widely used by social science 
scholars ± to analyse data collected for the content analysis. The detailed categories of the 
codebook were for the most part summarised into broader categories in order to identify 
general trends and patterns, for the purposes of presentation of data in this report 
 
Sampling 
We opted for two main sampling criteria: independence and relevance of media 
outlets. Firstly, we selected both those newspapers and television channels/programmes that 
are under the control of government or parties and others that are largely independent. 
Normally, media outlets from these broad groups tend to differ in their daily coverage of 
conflicts in periods of democratisation. There are those government- or party-controlled 
media that serve as little more than a mouthpiece: governments or parties own the media 
and/or appoint editorial personnel and therefore control editorial policies. Other media outlets 
are close to governments or parties, in terms of generally following political directives, but 
without any formal links to them. On the other hand, media that are largely free from 
government or party control may also differ between themselves: some may follow a general 
ideological or other line, without being loyal to governments or parties, while editorial policies 
of other media may be exclusively guided by market interests and news values, without any 
political alignment. While the degree of government control or independence from it varies 
across our very different political contexts (i.e., Egypt, Kenya, Serbia and South Africa), this 
division still captures the main ways in which media outlets cover politically controversial 
issues, especially those related to democratisation (see Table 3). 
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Secondly, we chose those media outlets that were highly relevant in the coverage of 
selected democratisation conflicts, drawing on expertise of country specialists involved in the 
MeCoDEM project. Some media outlets were relevant because of their circulation/reach and 
others due to their agenda-setting capacity, or both. Initially, we aimed to include both print 
and broadcast media in our sample since such inclusion would largely represent traditional 
media coverage of the conflicts. Still, difficulties in obtaining access to broadcast media 
content in several countries directed us principally towards the quantitative analysis of 
newspapers. These difficulties involved the lack of archives of broadcast media material or, 
alternatively, high costs of access to such archives where they existed. The exception is 
Serbia where our researchers managed to get access to digitised archives of print and 
broadcast material for three out of four conflicts and to traditional archives of media content 
for the remaining conflict.  
 
Table 3: Selected media outlets 
Country Title Media outlet Independence a) N 
Egypt Al-Ahram 
El-Masri Al-Yaum 
Shuruq 
Newspaper 
Newspaper 
Newspaper 
Low to medium 
Medium to high 
Medium to high 
261 
341 
345 
Kenya The Nation 
The Standard 
The Star 
Newspaper 
Newspaper 
Newspaper 
Medium 
Low to medium 
Medium to high 
719 
477 
353 
Serbia Politika Newspaper Medium to high 377 
 9HþHUQMHQRYRVWL Newspaper Medium 487 
 RTS Public broadcaster b Medium to highc 288 
 B92 Private broadcasterb Medium to high 366 
 Blic (2010 and 2015) Newspaper Medium 96 
 Danas (2010 and 2015) Newspaper Medium to high 105 
 Pravda (2010) Newspaper Medium to high 39 
 Press (2010) Newspaper Low to medium 55 
 Pink (2010 and 2015) Private broadcasterb Low to medium 34 
 Prva (2010 and 2015) Private broadcasterb Medium 22 
 Informer (2015) Newspaper Low 39 
 1DãHQRYLQH Newspaper Low to medium 13 
South Africa Business Day 
Daily Sun 
Mail and Guardian 
New Age (except for 2008) 
Newspaper 
Newspaper 
Newspaper 
Newspaper 
High 
High 
High 
Low to medium 
192 
233 
142 
178 
Total 
 
  5162 
a Note that the level of independence relates to the period of the coded conflict. 
b
 We coded news stories in central TV news programmes. 
c
 Except in 2001 when the score was Low to medium. 
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Table 4 breaks the sample down into individual conflict cases. The uneven number of 
coded items across the four countries reflects the particular difficulties faced by research 
teams in some countries. For example, country teams in South Africa and Egypt experienced 
considerable obstacles in trying to acquire access to print and broadcast media archives, 
which reduced the time left for the coding process itself. Moreover, a high volume of relevant 
newspaper articles published on some of the selected democratisation conflicts, especially in 
Egypt and Kenya, made it necessary to select a random sample, which required the listing of 
all relevant articles as a first step of the sampling process. The South African team focused 
primarily on service delivery conflicts, which are by their very nature protracted and without 
easily identifiable peaks in media coverage, which meant that they had to experiment with 
various sampling methods. The listing of all relevant items would have produced a very high 
YROXPH RI LWHPV ZKLOH µFRQVWUXFWHG ZHHN¶ VDPSOLQJ LQLWLDOO\ IDLOHG WR SURYLGH D VXIILFLHQW
number of items. These various problems together with the availability of staff are also 
reflected in the sample size achieved by each of the country teams. 
Nevertheless, the four country teams overcame these challenges and the integrated 
dataset created through the quantitative content analysis provides ample high-quality 
empirical material to describe and analyse media representations of democratisation conflicts 
in Egypt, Kenya, Serbia and South Africa. 
 
Table 4: Number of coded items by conflict case 
Country Conflict Case N Percent 
(country) 
Egypt Maspero incident (2011) 300 31.7 
 Christian-Muslim violence (2013) 175 18.5 
 Presidential Election (2012) 472 49.8 
 Total (Egypt) 947 100.0 
Kenya Presidential election (2007) 337 21.8 
 Presidential election (2013) 786 50.7 
 Somali community (2013-2014) 426 27.5 
 Total (Kenya)
 
1549
 
100.0
 
Serbia Transitional justice (2001) 661 34.4 
 Parliamentary election (2008) 561 29.2 
 Pride parade (2010) 420 21.9 
 Ombudsman (2015) 279 14.5 
 Total (Serbia)
 
1921
 
100.0
 
South Africa Service delivery protests (2009-10, 2013-14) 278 37.3 
 Xenophobic attacks (2008, 2015) 386 51.8 
 State of the Nation Address (2015) 81 10.9 
 Total (South Africa)
 
745
 
100.0 
Total (All) 
 
5162 100.0 
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Causes of democratisation conflicts 
This and the following sections are organised thematically and present and discuss 
data about the main conflict causes, conflict parties, preferred strategies to deal with 
conflicts, perception of democracy in its institutional, individual and societal aspects, role of 
the media, authoritarian past, bias, emotions and polarisation in media reporting. 
One of the key aspects of media reporting on conflicts in transitions from authoritarian 
rule and in new democracies is which causes of conflicts they identify as prominent. 
Journalists are expected not only to describe events, but also to provide contextual 
information and analysis, which is difficult to achieve under the time constraints that they 
normally face in their work. This section of the report assesses how journalists provide 
context in their reporting of democratisation conflicts by examining a range of relevant 
themes. Guided by a theoretical understanding of democratisation conflicts, we developed a 
list of potential causes of conflict, relevant to different conflict types and country contexts. 
Table 5 summarises WKHPHGLD¶VLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRIWKHFDXVHVRIFRQIOLFWVDVURRWHGLQSROLWLFDO
institutions, political culture, the judicial system, economic conditions, collective identities and 
international influences. Note that coded items could have more than one cause. 
 
Table 5: Causes of conflict by country (%)*) 
Causes Egypt Kenya Serbia South Africa Total 
Political institutions 66.8 76.6 42.8 44.4 57.6 
Judicial/legal 34.5 47.2 53.7 39.6 46.2 
Political culture 65.4 35.2 17.3 68.9 39.0 
International 8.6 9.1 34.0 2.8 17.4 
Identities 31.0 10.1 10.5 17.9 15.2 
Economic 12.7 10.3 4.9 47.1 14.0 
*) Multiple causes per unit possible. 
 
Overall, our data show that political institutions are perceived in media reporting as 
the most significant cause of selected democratisation conflicts, followed by judicial issues 
DQGSROLWLFDO FXOWXUH7KXV µUHDOLW\¶ FUHDWHGE\ WKHPHGLDSRUWUD\VGHPRFUDWLVDWLRQ FRQIOLFWV
primarily as conflicts that unfold within, or spill over from, political institutions rather than, for 
example, economic conditions. As a key institution of democratic politics, elections as an 
institutional cause of conflict become particularly salient during election campaigns. Since 
four of our selected conflict cases (Egypt 2012, Kenya 2007 and 2013, Serbia 2008) are 
elections, the significance of political institutions as perceived causes of conflicts can 
therefore be assumed to be somewhat exaggerated in the data (see Table 6).  
Closely related to political institutions is political culture, which emerged as a very 
important cause of conflict in media coverage, in particular in South Africa and Egypt. 
Conflict cases that stand out as being caused by a lack of democratic political culture are the 
.HQ\DQ  HOHFWLRQ DQG 6RXWK $IULFD¶V VHUYLFH GHOLYHU\ FRQIOLFWV )XUther qualitative 
analyses will have to explore why political culture is a more dominant aspect of public 
discourse in South Africa and Egypt than in Serbia and Kenya. 
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In line with the institutional focus of media coverage, judicial or legal causes come 
just after political institutions in terms of significance. It turns out that democratisation 
conflicts are not only about politics broadly conceived, but also have an important legal 
angle. Much of the media coverage on judicial problems originates from debates triggered by 
political violence and law enforcement, regardless of whether or not it relates to terrorism and 
elections with ethnic backgrounds in Kenya, xenophobic attacks in South Africa, Muslim-
Christian violence in Egypt or right-wing violence at SHUELD¶V3ULGHSDUDGH ,Q6HUELD WKHUH
ZDVDOVRDWUDQVLWLRQDOMXVWLFHSHUVSHFWLYHUHODWHGWRWKHDUUHVWDQGH[WUDGLWLRQRI0LORãHYLüWR
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in The Hague (ICTY). 
Interestingly, this legal angle was PLVVLQJ IURP PHGLD UHSRUWLQJ RQ .HQ\D¶V  HOHFWLRQ
WKDW WRRNSODFHDJDLQVW WKHEDFNGURSRI.HQ\DWWD¶V LQGLFWPHQWE\ WKH ,QWHUQDWLRQDO&ULPLQDO
Court (ICC). 
The other causes are seen as much less relevant. International causes are perceived 
as very significant in Serbia only, reflecting an international dimension of the 2001 conflict 
over the arrest and extradition of MiORãHYLü DQG WKH  HOHFWLRQV FRQIOLFW WKDW IRFXVHG
SULQFLSDOO\ RQ WKH LVVXHV RI 6HUELD¶V SRWHQWLDO LQWHJUDWLRQ LQWR WKH (XURSHDQ 8QLRQ DQG RQ
.RVRYR¶V VHFHVVLRQ &ROOHFWLYH LGHQWLWLHV DV FDXVHV DUH PRUH UHOHYDQW LQ (J\SW DQG 6RXWK
Africa than in Serbia and Kenya ± despite our focus on identity-charged conflicts in the latter 
two countries. A similar pattern can be found with regard to political culture as perceived 
cause of conflict. Finally, economic causes are significant only in conflicts in South Africa, 
which are fuelled by poverty and chronic inequality.  
/RRNLQJ DW WKH PHGLD¶V FDXVDO LQWHUSUHWDWLRQV RI FRQIOLFWV DFURVV GLIIHUHQW W\SHV RI
conflict (see Table 6), we find a wide variation of perceived causes of conflict. For example, 
citizenship conflicts are primarily put down to judicial factors, followed by political culture and 
collective identities in equal measures, implying that the media approach conflicts over 
citizenship from the perspective of both rights and cultural factors. Likewise, perceived 
FDXVHV RI WKH DUUHVW DQG H[WUDGLWLRQ RI 0LORãHYLü WR WKH ,&7< FRPH IURP MXGLFLDO DQG
international angles, as well as that of political institutions, which reveals competing views in 
media framing of this conflict.  
 
Table 6: Causes of conflict by conflict type (%)*) 
Causes  Citizenship Power Elections Transitional 
justice 
Total 
Political institutions 28.9 55.3 84.7 33.4 57.6 
Judicial/legal 67.1 36.6 25.8 82.0 46.2 
Political culture 41.7 36.8 48.7 4.2 39.0 
International 13.1 4.6 18.0 42.5 17.4 
Identities 36.7 7.6 8.5 2.1 15.2 
Economic 16.1 24.8 11.3 3.2 14.0 
*) Multiple causes per unit possible. 
 
Unsurprisingly, political causes featured most prominently in conflicts that focused on 
election campaigns and power distribution, while judicial causes were highly significant for 
transitional justice and citizenship conflicts (most of the latter involved violence). Meanwhile, 
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international causes are perceived as important for transitional justice conflicts (i.e., 
indictments by international courts) and identity causes for citizenship conflicts. Finally, 
economic factors are largely absent as explanatory factors for democratisation conflicts with 
the exception of power-related conflicts, which involve accusations of corruption and political 
inefficiency. 
 
Conflict parties 
To identify who the media portray as the key opponents in the selected 
conflicts, we coded the two main conflict parties per story that can be combined to interacting 
pairs. Political authorities ± including government, parliament, executive forces on national 
and sub-national levels ± featured by far the most frequently in the media coverage of 
democratisation conflicts in the four countries, followed by political parties and citizens (as 
individual or collective actors without a clear group affiliation, for example, demonstrators). 
Identity groups, related to ethnicity, religion or sexual orientation, appeared in the media 
coverage as a distant fourth conflict party. Table 7 shows for each of these conflict parties 
their specific constellation of opponents as represented in media coverage.  
 
Table 7: Conflict parties and their opponents 
 
Conflict party Opponent Total % (N) Partial % (N) 
Political authorities 
 
58.1  (2511) 
 
 Political authorities  21.6 (542) 
 Political parties  16.2 (406) 
 Citizens  23.2 (583) 
 Identity groups  6.1 (153) 
 Militant groups  11.9 (299) 
 International actors  15.2 (381) 
 Others  5.6 (147) 
 Total  100  (2511) 
Political parties 
 
35.9 (1551) 
 
 Political authorities  26.2 (406) 
 Political parties  48.4 (750) 
 Citizens  11.5 (179) 
 Identity groups  6.4 (100) 
 Militant groups  0.3 (4) 
 International actors  3.7 (58) 
 Others  3.5 (54) 
 Total  100 (1551) 
Citizens  27.9 (1207)  
 Political authorities  48.3 (583) 
 Political parties  14.8 (179) 
 Citizens  23.8  (287) 
 Identity groups  3.3 (40) 
 Militant groups  4.6 (55) 
 International actors  2.2 (26) 
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 Others  3.1 (37) 
 Total  100 (1207) 
Identity groups  10.6 (458)  
 Political authorities  33.4 (153) 
 Political parties  21.8 (100) 
 Citizens  8.7 (40) 
 Identity groups  22.5 (103) 
 Militant groups  6.3 (29) 
 International actors  1.7 (8) 
 Others  5.5 (25) 
 Total  100 (458) 
 
Starting with the conflict constellations in which political authorities are involved, it 
appears that their main opponents are citizens and their public expressions of discontent and 
even hostility. This constellation makes up for nearly a quarter of all conflicts in which political 
authorities are represented on the media agenda as one of the conflict parties. Otherwise, 
political authorities are mainly engaged in conflicts with other elites, ranging from other 
branches of government and political parties to international actors. 
For political parties, by far the most prominent opponents are other political parties. 
About half of all conflicts in which political parties are involved are directed at other political 
parties. This pattern reflects the competitive nature of democratic elections, which ± as 
outlined before ± form a central part of the MeCoDEM research programme. The other major 
opponent of political parties are political authorities and, to a lesser degree, citizens. 
Almost half of the conflicts in which citizens are one of the conflict parties, involve 
political authorities as the main opponent, which is not surprising given that most public 
protests are directed at the government and frequently are accompanied by clashes with 
security forces. What is perhaps more surprising is the fact that nearly one quarter of 
FLWL]HQV¶ FRQIOLFWV LQYROYH FRQIOLFWVZLWKRWKHr citizens, indicating the divisions within society 
during transitional conflicts. This horizontal pattern of conflict constellation is also apparent 
with regard to identity groups. Here conflicts with other identity groups and citizens comprise 
a similar proportion as conflicts with political authorities. 
In the next step we investigate how the media evaluate the conflict parties, either by 
adopting the evaluations expressed by the conflict parties themselves or by expressing their 
own evaluations. Evaluation is measured on a 5-point scale, where 1 indicates a strongly 
positive evaluation and 5 a strongly negative, while the midpoint 3 indicates an even mixture 
between positive and negative attributes. Overall, 76.2 % of units (newspaper articles, 
broadcast news items) included evaluations of at least one of the conflict parties, reflecting 
the high degree of contestation during democratisation conflicts. Correlating the evaluative 
scores of the two conflict parties gives an indication of the degree to which media portrayals 
FUHDWH GLYLVLYH LPDJHV RI µXV¶ DQG µWKHP¶ D QHJDWLYH FRUUHODWLRQ GHQRWHV WR D SRVLWLYH
evaluation of one conflict party while the other one is evaluated negatively. Positive 
correlations indicate either positive or negative evaluations of both conflict parties. In Table 8 
the first column shows the correlation between the two evaluation scales based on evaluative 
units only. The second column comprises all units, including those evaluation, which were 
WUHDWHGDVµEDODQFHG¶LHSXWRQWKe middle point of the scale. 
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Table 8: (YDOXDWLRQRIFRQIOLFWSDUWLHV3HDUVRQ¶VU 
 Evaluative units only All units 
All -.21** -.16** 
Country   
Egypt -.50** -.41** 
Kenya -.19** -.14** 
Serbia -.20** -.18** 
South Africa .11ns .07ns 
Conflict type   
Citizenship -.53** -.43** 
Power -.12* -.11** 
Elections -.02ns .03ns 
Transitional justice -.41** -.22** 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
 
Looking at the pattern of evaluation, media coverage in Egypt stands out as the one 
ZLWK WKHVKDUSHVWGLYLVLRQEHWZHHQ µXV¶DQG µWKHP¶ LPSO\LQJ WKH MX[WDSRVLWLRQRIXQDQLPRXV
support of one of the conflict parties and demonization of the opponent. Media coverage in 
Kenya and Serbia takes a middle position, while there seems to be no such divisive 
representations of conflict parties in South Africa. With regard to conflict types, citizen 
FRQIOLFWV RYHU LQFOXVLRQ DQG H[FOXVLRQ JHQHUDWH WKH VKDUSHVW µXV-WKHP¶ GLYLVLRQV LQ PHGLD
coverage, closely followed by conflicts over transitional justice. In contrast, election coverage 
features as a rather balanced arena of contestation, indicated by weak and insignificant 
correlation scores.  
 
Preferred solutions to conflicts 
An important aspect in the study of media reporting on democratisation conflicts 
relates to suggested or promoted solutions to conflicts at stake. Overall, almost three 
quarters (72,6%) of coded media items engage in a discussion of possible solutions to the 
conflict at hand, reflecting the urgent need for solutions in conflictual, often dangerous 
situations. Table 9 presents different modes of conflict solutions, measured on a 5-point 
scale, with low scores indicating a preference for approach [a] and high scores indicating 
preference for approach [b]. These variables are about general approaches for dealing with 
conflict and not about specific policies. 
Our data suggest that discourses about conflict treatment are dominated by the 
option of institutional versus cultural approaches, with a clear endorsement of institutional, as 
opposed to cultural, bottom-up solutions for democratisation conflicts. With regard to different 
modes of conflict solutions, there was no clear preference for either gradual, peaceful 
change, based on compromise and toleration, or radical, violent change, based on the lack of 
compromise and intolerance.  
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Table 9: Preference for specific strategies to deal with conflict by country* [Means (N)] 
Preferred strategy Egypt Kenya Serbia South 
Africa 
Total 
Evolution/gradual change [a] vs. 
revolution/radical change [b] 
2.10 
(21) 
3.38 
(85) 
3.70 
(20) 
2.14 
(35) 
2.98 
(161) 
Compromise/cooperation [a] vs. 
no compromise/no cooperation 
[b] 
2.45 
(51) 
2.83 
(459) 
3.26 
(501) 
2.16 
(82) 
2.96 
(1093) 
Peaceful [a] vs. violent action [b] 2.57 
(37) 
2.36 
(146) 
2.50 
(14) 
1.89 
(44) 
2.32 
(241) 
Toleration [a] vs. intolerance/  
repression [b] 
2.43 
(14) 
2.56 
(48) 
2.62 
(13) 
2.26 
(31) 
2.46 
(106) 
Institutional [a] vs. cultural 
approach [b] 
2.17 
(293) 
2.18 
(586) 
1.88 
(963) 
2.23 
(305) 
2.05 
(2147) 
Other 2.00 
(2) 
/ 
(0) 
2.00 
(1) 
1.90 
(10) 
1.92 
(13) 
Total 2.24 
(418) 
2.52 
(1324) 
2.37 
(1512) 
2.18 
(507) 
2.38 
(3761) 
* Scale: 1 Strong preference for [a]. 2 preference for [a]. 3 combination of both [a+b]. 4 preference for 
[b]. 5 strong preference for [b] 
There was an interesting cross-national variation in the data. For example. we found 
a contrast between a preference for revolutionary change with little compromise and co-
operation in Serbia and that for evolutionary change based on compromise and co-operation 
in South Africa. There was also a considerably greater focus on peaceful solutions and 
toleration in South Africa than in Serbia. while the opposite was the case with regard to 
institutional solutions. It could be that the data reflect different historical experiences with 
democratisation in the two countries ± pacted and gradual transition from apartheid to 
democracy in South Africa and fast. revolutionary regime change in Serbia ± which over time 
shaped their political cultures in contrasting ways.  
Table 10 utilises the same set of variables. broken down for different conflict types: 
 
Table 10: Preference for specific strategies to deal with conflict by conflict type* [Means (N)] 
Preferred strategy Citizenship Power Elections Transition-
al justice 
Total 
Evolution/gradual change [a] vs. 
revolution/radical change [b] 
3.32 
(77) 
1.94 
(34) 
3.11 
(47) 
4.00 
(3) 
2.98 
(161) 
Compromise/cooperation [a] vs. 
no compromise/no cooperation 
[b] 
3.01 
(133) 
2.71 
(152) 
2.93 
(610) 
3.21 
(198) 
2.96 
(1093) 
Peaceful [a] vs. violent action [b] 1.83 
(42) 
2.06 
(32) 
2.50 
(162) 
2.00 
(5) 
2.32 
(241) 
Toleration [a] vs. intolerance. 
repression [b] 
2.53 1.76 2.76 / 2.46 
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(47) (21) (38) (0) (106) 
Institutional [a] vs. cultural 
approach [b] 
2.13 
(672) 
1.96 
(395) 
2.10 
(771) 
1.84 
(309) 
2.05 
(2147) 
Other 2.50 
(2) 
1.78 
(9) 
2.00 
(1) 
2.00 
(1) 
1.92 
(13) 
Total 2.35 
(973) 
2.13 
(643) 
2.50 
(1629) 
2.38 
(516) 
2.38 
(3761) 
* Scale: 1 Strong preference for [a]. 2 preference for [a]. 3 combination of both [a+b]. 4 preference for 
[b]. 5 strong preference for [b] 
Regarding conflict types. media coverage of conflicts about the distribution and 
control of power suggests preference for more gradual and institutional solutions. based on 
compromise and toleration. In contrast. the representation of electoral and citizenship 
conflicts is characterised by more uncompromising approaches to conflict solution (note that 
cases for transitional justice conflicts are too low to allow for interpretation). In spite of rather 
hardened positions in conflicts surrounding citizenship and elections. calls for violence or 
repression are outnumbered by statements that promote some form of peaceful solution and 
toleration. 
 
Perception of democracy 
The next part of our analysis is concerned with media discourses on democracy and 
related norms in the context of selected democratisation conflicts. We designed a set of 
variables that identify specific dimensions of democracy and their evaluation. Specifically. we 
distinguish between aspects of democracy that are related to the institutional order. individual 
rights and opportunities and societal correlates of democracy. such as pluralism. welfare and 
others. Each of these general dimensions is further distinguished into specific issues. which 
are then measured on a 5-point scale of positive versus negative evaluation. For the sake of 
simplicity. Tables 11 and 12 only show the general dimensions of democracy and their 
evaluation. but the interpretation of the findings will also take the specific aspects into 
account.   
Table 11: Evaluation of democracy by country* [Means (N)] 
Aspects of 
democracy 
Egypt Kenya Serbia South Africa Total 
Institutionala) 2.69 
(335) 
2.13 
(1126) 
2.04 
(758) 
3.62 
(473) 
2.44 
(2692) 
Individualb) 2.37 
(268) 
2.79 
(340) 
1.96 
(406) 
3.47 
(448) 
2.69 
(1462) 
Societyc) 2.18 
(218) 
2.10 
(952) 
1.95 
(502) 
3.75 
(494) 
2.45 
(2166) 
* Scale: 1 strongly positive. 2 positive. 3 mixed. ambiguous. 4 negative. 5 strongly negative 
a) Includes: the general principal of democracy. elections. governance. rule of law. media and press 
freedom; 
b) Includes: general principals of dignity and self-determination. citizenship. human rights. freedom of 
expression. economic freedom; 
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c) Includes: general principles such as pluralism and secularism. group rights. social cohesion. market 
and welfare. 
 
Our data show that for the most part the media portray democracy in a positive light. 
more so with respect to its institutional and societal dimensions than individual rights and 
liberties. Across all four countries. the perception of democratic institutions in general is more 
positive (mean: 2.10) than aspects of actual governance (mean: 2.70). This is hardly 
surprising since high expectations of democracy are rarely met in real life. especially in 
adverse political and economic conditions that usually accompany democratisation. This gap 
is widest in Egypt (mean evaluation of democratic principles: 1.72; of actual governance: 
3.04). ZKLFK UHIOHFWV KLJK OHYHOV RI LQVWDELOLW\ DQG FRQIOLFW LQ WUDQVLWLRQ IURP 0XEDUDN¶V
authoritarianism during the time that is covered by our media sample. 
There is a wide cross-national variation in the evaluations of democracy. with Serbia 
being an outlier on the positive side of the spectrum and South Africa on the negative one. 
This finding is puzzling since the two countries appear to be more advanced in terms of 
democratisation than Kenya and Egypt. which suggests that their evaluations of democracy 
in media coverage should rise and fall together. in comparison with the other two countries. 
In Serbia. especially positive evaluations are those related to elections. the rule of law. 
human rights. social cohesion and economic issues. Such assessments suggest a broad 
satisfaction with WKHVWDWHRIGHPRFUDF\LQWKHILUVWGHFDGHDIWHUWKHIDOORI0LORãHYLü. despite 
a low quality of democracy estimated by both professional and casual observers. 
Kenya comes close in terms of positive evaluations. with regard to the institutional 
and societal aspects of democracy. largely thanks to positive assessment of elections. 
governance. social cohesion and economic issues. This is not the case in the evaluations of 
GHPRFUDF\¶V LQGLYLGXDODVSHFWV. PDLQO\GXHWR WKHPL[HGDVVHVVPHQWRI.HQ\D¶V UHFRUGRQ
human rights. 
At this point it is important to remind ourselves that these data do not reflect the state 
of democracy in the four countries under study or popular perceptions of democracy. but the 
PHGLD¶V µFRQVWUXFWLRQ¶ RI GHPRFUDF\ ZKLFK PLJKW RU PLJKW QRt correspond with the 
circumstances on the ground. The positive evaluations of governance in Kenya and the rule 
of law in Serbia underline this point. as these countries are struggling with widespread 
corruption and a weak judicial system. One conclusion from this apparent discrepancy 
EHWZHHQµPHGLDUHDOLW\¶DQGµSROLWLFDOUHDOLW\¶ZRXOGEHWKDWWKHPHGLDGRQRWVXIILFLHQWO\IXOILO
their role of watchdogs of political power. as models of professional journalism would imply. 
But the discrepancy between media coverage and real events might also hint at a positive 
role of the media. 
For example. the evaluation of elections in Kenya might come as a surprise given the 
large-scale violence that accompanied the 2007 election and still cast its shadow over the 
2013 election. Our data suggest that the mainstream media of our sample tried to project a 
positive image of elections. while intolerance and hate speech seem to have occupied other 
media spaces. both online and offline. Further in-depth analysis is necessary to shed more 
light on the role and interconnectedness of different media spaces in the development of 
intergroup violence during and after elections. 
A similar evaluative pattern can be observed with regard to the evaluation of 
individual and societal aspects of democracy. Again. South African media stand out in their 
negative view. especially on citizenship and economic opportunities for the disadvantaged 
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(means: 3.35 and 3.87 respectively). There is also great concern about social cohesion in the 
country (mean: 3.73). which twenty years after its celebrated transition is at risk of 
disintegrating. In contrast. Serbian media see democracy as a means of individual 
empowerment (mean: 1.97). protection of human rights (mean: 1.94) and social cohesion 
(mean: 1.79). On most accounts. media representations of democracy in Egypt and Kenya 
sit somewhere between these extremes. 
Table 12 shows media evaluations of democracy by conflict type. We find surprisingly 
positive evaluations of democracy in the context of elections conflicts. despite the tensions 
DQGYLROHQFH LQFRQQHFWLRQZLWK(J\SW¶VSUHVLGHQWLDOHOHFWLRQDQG.HQ\D¶VHOHFWLRQV LQ
+HUHWKHPHGLD¶VSRVLWLYHSRUWUD\DOFDQEHXQGHUVWRRGSULPDULO\DVDQDSSHDOWRZKDW
role elections should play in a democracy. rather than a reflection of the events themselves. 
The positive assessment of transitional justice conflict mainly reflects the reporting of 
6HUELD¶VFRQIOLFW:LWKLQWKHFRQWH[WRIFLWL]HQVKLSFRQIOLFWVWKHHYDOXDWLRQRIGHPRFUDF\
moves towards more mixed. ambiguous evaluations. whereas conflicts over the control of 
power shed a primarily negative light on democratic politics.  
 
Table 12: Evaluation of democracy by conflict type* [Means (N)] 
Aspects of 
democracy 
Citizenship Power Elections Transitional 
justice 
Total 
Institutionala) 2.69 
(570) 
3.27 
(411) 
2.19 
(1464) 
1.94 
(247) 
2.44 
(2692) 
Individualb) 2.91 
(627) 
3.04 
(284) 
2.34 
(458) 
1.89 
(93) 
2.69 
(1462) 
Societyc) 2.57 
(911) 
3.66 
(226) 
2.08 
(971) 
1.93 
(58) 
2.45 
(2166) 
* Scale: 1 Strongly positive. 2 positive. 3 mixed. ambiguous. 4 negative. 5 strongly negative 
a) Includes: the general principal of democracy. elections. governance. rule of law. media and press 
freedom; 
b) Includes: general principals of dignity and self-determination. citizenship. human rights. freedom of 
expression. economic freedom; 
c) Includes: general principles such as pluralism and secularism. group rights. social cohesion. market 
and welfare. 
 
 
Role of the media 
Our codebook also includes a set of variables to measure the role of the media in 
democratic transitions and how this role is evaluated. Following the conceptualisation of 
journalistic roles suggested by Christians et al. (2009). we distinguish between the following 
categories: the monitorial role focuses on providing information that enables citizens to fulfil 
their rule; the facilitator role views the media as an enabling force in the development of civil 
society. social cohesion. tolerance and democratisation; the collaborative role focuses on 
working together with the government in order to advance goals such as economic 
development and institution building; the radical role corresponds with the watchdog role that 
challenges political authority and holds power to account. Evaluative variables then establish 
whether these norms are regarded as desirable and how well actual media coverage fulfils 
these roles. 
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The main finding in this part of the content analysis is that there was very little 
discussion in media coverage of the role media should and did play in democratisation 
conflicts (only 2.54% of all coded items include a normative evaluation of media roles and 
7.54% evaluate actual performance). Obviously. the media act as a very effective gatekeeper 
when it comes to reflecting on. and criticising their own activities. As a consequence. media 
tend to underreport those views that challenge normative assumptions of their own role in 
democracy or aim to hold the media to account as a powerful force in political life. Table 13 
presents normative and performance evaluations of the four media roles mentioned above. 
 
Table 13: Evaluation of media* [Means (N)] 
Role of the media Normative evaluation Performance 
evaluation 
Difference between 
normative and 
performance 
Monitorial 2.69 
(45) 
3.40 
(156) 
0.71 
Facilitator 2.25 
(44) 
2.76 
(51) 
0.51 
Collaborative 3.11 
(18) 
3.98 
(52) 
0.87 
Radical 2.39 
(18) 
2.80 
(25) 
0.41 
Other 3.75 
(4) 
4.44 
(98) 
0.69 
Total 2.59 
(129) 
3.62 
(382) 
1.03 
* 1 Strongly positive. 2 positive. 3 mixed. conditional. 4 negative. 5 strongly negative
 
When it comes to normative preferences expressed by the media in our sample. the 
facilitator role appears as the most desirable one. whereas the collaborative role is seen as 
most negative. The monitorial and the radical role. which dominate western journalism. fall in 
between. The opposing evaluation of the facilitator and the collaborative role is interesting 
because in practice they often overlap. Both are aimed at working for achieving wider 
societal goals in situations of political and social change. However. while the facilitator role 
expects the media to collaborate with civil society. the collaborator role places the media in 
close interaction with the government. WKXV SRVLQJ D SRWHQWLDO WKUHDW WR WKH PHGLD¶V
independence and critical abilities. For both roles. our data reveal a large gap between 
normative expectations and actual journalistic practice. SRVVLEO\LQGLFDWLQJµWRROLWWOH¶DQGµWRR
PXFK¶ ZLWK UHJDUG WR WKH PHGLD¶V DELOLW\ WR UHVSRQG WR H[WHUQDO QHHGV DQG GHPDQGV IRU
further insights into these normative dilemmas based on results from interviews with 
journalists see Lohner. Banjac and Neverla 2016). There is also a considerable gap in 
expectations and performance of the media with regard to how they provide citizens with 
information essential for their political participation. 
Table 14 explores differences and similarities of media evaluations across countries 
and conflict types. 
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Table 14: Evaluation of media by country and conflict type* [Means (N)] 
 Normative evaluation Performance 
evaluation 
Difference between 
normative and 
performance 
Country 
   
Egypt 2.40 
(40) 
4.04 
(164) 
1.64 
Kenya 2.98 
(47) 
3.09 
(47) 
0.11 
Serbia 2.58 
(24) 
3.54 
(158) 
0.96 
South Africa 2.25 
(20) 
2.25 
(20) 
0.00 
Total 2.62 
(131) 
3.63 
(389) 
1.01 
Conflict type 
   
Citizenship 2.85 
(46) 
3.39 
(72) 
0.54 
Power 1.94 
(18) 
4.05 
(155) 
2.11 
Elections 2.62 
(64) 
3.44 
(108) 
0.82 
Transitional justice 3.00 
(3) 
3.17 
(54) 
0.17 
Total 2.62 
(131) 
3.63 
(389) 
1.01 
* 1 Strongly positive. 2 positive. 3 mixed. conditional. 4 negative. 5 strongly negative 
 
7KHPHGLD¶VHYDOXDWLRQRI WKHLU RZQ UROH LQSXEOLF OLIHGLIIHUVZLGHO\DFURVV WKH IRXU
countries of our sample. A gap between expectations and reality is most pronounced in 
Egypt. where in the tumultuous period during the power struggles that fROORZHG 0XEDUDN¶V
fall. the media were torn between high-flying hopes and persisting constraints. In contrast. 
actual media performance in South Africa fully matches normative expectations. which rather 
than pointing at a well-functioning journalism in the country. might raise concerns about the 
PHGLD¶VDELOLW\DQGZLOOLQJQHVV WRHQJDJH LQFULWLFDO UHIOHFWLRQDERXW WKHLURZQ UROH LQ6RXWK
$IULFD¶VWURXEOHGWUDQVLWLRQ 
Turning to media evaluations in the context of different types of conflict. the gap 
between what is desirable and what is possible is even wider. This applies in particular to the 
PHGLD¶VSHUIRUPDQFHLQFRQIOLFWVRYHUWKHGLVWULEXWLRQDQGFRQWURORISRZHU$PHDQRI.05 
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on a 5-point scale shows that nearly all evaluative statements about the PHGLD¶V UROH LQ
power conflicts are negative. This verdict might reflect the problematic close relationship with 
political power holders that come with the collaborative role discussed in the previous table. 
 
Authoritarian past 
Democratic transitions might be driven by hopes for a better future. but they also have 
to cope with the traumas of the past. Emerging democracies are therefore faced with the 
decision whether or not to cope with experiences of a past that might involve large-scale 
atrocities. issues of guilt and revenge and feelings of humiliation. In some cases. a society 
might opt to move on; others decide to engage in a national debate about the past. Our data 
show that there was a significant space for references to the past in media coverage of 
democratisation conflicts in the four countries (18.2% of all coded items). despite the fact that 
only two out of eleven conflicts ± 6HUELD
VFRQIOLFWDERXW0LORãHYLü¶VDUUHVWDQG.HQ\D
V
2013 election ± explicitly dealt with the past and that many of our conflicts unfolded several 
years after the breakdown of the old regime. There was also a significant cross-national 
variation with regard to the space allocated to the past. Egypt is an outlier on the higher end 
(31.8% of the coded items addressed issues of the past) and South Africa on the lower end 
(10.2%); probably reflecting the passage of time since the established authoritarian regime 
ended. 
Most of the media coverage that addresses the past focuses on established 
authoritarian regimes and less so on governments after their breakdown. There is little room 
for nostalgia in the media of our sample: the evaluations of the old regimes in media 
discourse are negative throughout (means for evaluation of the Mubarak regime: 4.36. of 
0LORãHYLü¶V regime: 4.10. of Apartheid in South Africa: 4.10). while post-transition 
governments receive less harsh. but still largely negative evaluations (post-2000 
governments in Serbia: 3.77. Morsi government in Egypt: 3.89). It appears that new post-
authoritarian governments are not given much space and time to get their act together and 
deal with adverse legacies of the old regime in political. economic and social life. but are 
assessed critically in media reporting soon after they take control of the main levers of 
power.  
Further research is therefore required to explore a hypothesis from the literature that 
says that media coverage tends to be somewhat subdued in early stages of democratisation 
in order not to obstruct political and economic reforms necessary to deal with old regime 
legacies. It could be that the hypothesis applies in a somewhat modified form only to 
revolutionary transitions from authoritarian rule ± those in which the old regimes collapse 
principally through massive popular mobilization ± such as those in Egypt and Serbia. but not 
in pacted transitions. in which old regime soft-liners work together with opposition moderates 
to gradually build democratic institutions. 
References to the past can serve many different purposes. Table 15 explores the 
degree to which historical discourses are instrumentalised for political aims. 
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Table 15: Instrumentalisation of the past [% (N)] 
Reference to the past Egypt Kenya Serbia South 
Africa 
Total 
To call for reconciliation. unity 7.8 
(22) 
5.4 
(14) 
0.3 
(1) 
29.2 
(21) 
6.3 
(58) 
To emphasise/mobilise internal 
divisions 
6.8 
(19) 
1.9 
(5) 
4.9 
(15) 
40.3 
(29) 
7.4 
(68) 
To emphasise/mobilise external 
divisions 
0.4 
(1) 
0.8 
(2) 
3.6 
(11) 
- 1.5 
(14) 
To (re)interpret the past 13.9 
(39) 
15.8 
(41) 
23.8 
(73) 
13.9 
(10) 
17.7 
(163) 
To (re)interpret present regime 71.2 
(200) 
76.1 
(197) 
67.4 
(207) 
16.7 
(12) 
67.0 
(616) 
Total 100.0 
(281) 
100.0 
(259) 
100.0 
(307) 
100.0 
(72) 
100.0 
(919) 
 
References to the past in media coverage were employed for various reasons. but the 
most significant was to interpret current regimes/governments with interpretations of the past 
being a distant second. Only in South Africa did media reporting use references to the past to 
mobilise internal divisions or alternatively to highlight the need for reconciliation. This finding 
confirms the view according to which conflicts after authoritarian breakdown tend to focus on 
current issues as opposed to those of the past. even in the case of conflicts that are explicitly 
about the past ± such as those related to transitional justice in Serbia and Kenya. 
 
Overall tone and polarisation 
In this final section. we return to issues of journalistic quality in the coverage of 
democratisation conflicts. Here. ZH GR QRW UHO\ RQ WKH PHGLD¶V RZQ HYDOXDWLRQ RI WKHLU
performance (see Tables 13 and 14). but apply indicators that measure three key dimensions 
of quality in manifest media content: bias in our data refers to any favouritism towards one of 
the sides in a conflict. including supportive statements for one side and/or dismissive 
statements for the other(s). and selective representation of voices and opinions. Emotionality 
refers to the use of language in media coverage that emphasises feelings and emotional 
responses to events. Finally. polarisation is about speech acts and can be expressed by 
blaming (the other) conflict parties. using negative language to describe them or by appeals 
to hostile action. 
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Table 16: Tone of reporting by country [Means (N)] 
Dimensions of tone Egypt Kenya Serbia South Africa Total 
Bias (scale: 0-3)* 1.09 
(944) 
1.32 
(1545) 
1.68 
(1917) 
1.43 
(745) 
1.43 
(5151) 
Emotionality (scale: 1-3)** 1.50 
(943) 
1.63 
(1537) 
1.56 
(1914) 
1.73 
(725) 
1.59 
(5119) 
Polarisation (scale: 1-3)*** 1.78 
(414) 
1.69 
(1029) 
2.15 
(1720) 
1.97 
(535) 
1.96 
(3698) 
* Scale: 0 Neutral. 1 balanced. 2 somewhat biased. 3 very biased 
** Scale: 1 Detached/neutral language. 2 some emotional language. 3 very emotional. inflammatory 
language 
*** Scale: 1 Moderate speech. 2 somewhat polarising speech. 3 strongly polarising speech 
 
The data in Table 16 reveal similar trends across the four countries with regard to 
these three variables. Overall. media reporting of democratisation conflicts in the four 
countries featured balanced to somewhat biased language. neutral to somewhat emotional 
language and somewhat polarising speech. There was some cross-national variation in the 
reporting from these angles. revealing similar clustering of countries. Interestingly. media 
coverage of conflicts was more biased in Serbia and South Africa than in Kenya and Egypt. 
even though the former countries were more advanced with regard to democratisation than 
the latter during selected conflicts. Likewise. there was more polarisation in media coverage 
in Serbia and South Africa than in Kenya and Egypt. Finally. more emotional language was 
dominant in South Africa. while more detached/neutral language prevailed in Egypt. 
It could be that these trends reflect cautious media role in initial stages of transitions 
from authoritarian rule. when old dependencies on political power still persist and/or media 
take pains not to undermine new democratic governments after regime change. but become 
more actively involved in later stages of democratisation by switching to watchdog and 
activist roles. with the rise of polarisation in general (i.e.. the more advanced a democracy. 
the more space for competing media coverage of conflicts. including also biased and 
emotional reporting. even polarisation). There is some support for this conclusion from 
6HUELD¶V FRQIOLFWV ZH LGHQWLILHG D VWHDGLO\ JURZLQJ VKDUH RI ELDVHG DQG SRODULVLQJ VSHHFK. 
and of emotional language. over time ± from 2001 to 2008 to 2010 ± and then a slight shift 
back in 2015. with figures still higher than those for 2008. 
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Table 17: Tone of reporting by conflict type [Means (N)] 
Dimension of tone Citizenship Power Elections Transitional 
justice 
Total 
Bias (0-3)* 1.53 
(1406) 
1.29 
(932) 
1.41 
(2153) 
1.47 
(660) 
1.43 
(5151) 
Emotionality (1-3)** 1.60 
(1380) 
1.58 
(927) 
1.65 
(2152) 
1.39 
(660) 
1.59 
(5119) 
Polarisation (1-3)*** 1.99 
(1053) 
2.08 
(581) 
1.84 
(1503) 
2.07 
(561) 
1.96 
(3698) 
* Scale: 0 Neutral. 1 balanced. 2 somewhat biased. 3 very biased 
** Scale: 1 Detached/neutral language. 2 some emotional language. 3 very emotional. inflammatory 
language 
*** Scale: 1 Moderate speech. 2 somewhat polarising speech. 3 strongly polarising speech 
 
Having in mind high stakes associated with elections. an interesting finding shown in 
Table 17 is that they did not produce more biased reporting and more polarisation than other 
conflict types. Only with regard to emotional language were election campaigns at a higher 
end. Election campaigns in fact featured the least polarising speech in relation to other 
conflict types. Further research is required to find out why this is the case. One explanation 
could be the degree to which elections are truly competitive. free and fair. that is. how 
democratic a regime is. Another reason can be a high degree of control over media coverage 
during election campaigns. Many established democracies impose strict regulations to 
ensure unbiased media coverage during election times. In emerging democracies media 
dependency on political actors can either lead to centralised control by the incumbent 
government. resulting in rather uniform pro-government reporting. or to capture of the media 
by competing political camps. resulting in sharp polarisation. As mentioned above. Kenya¶V
elections in 2007 and 2013 are in particular exemplary cases for both scenarios.  
 
Conclusion 
The main finding from the content analysis is that cross-national variations that we 
found in media reporting of democratisation conflicts appear to depend on several factors. 
Our data strongly reflect specific country contexts (and contexts of broader regions from 
which they come from) to be a consistent factor that shapes the pattern of media coverage. 
reflecting the close interdependence between media and politics. For example. the army is 
perceived as a relevant political institution in Egypt (and much of the Middle East) ± due to its 
dominant role in politics since independence from colonial rule ± but not in other countries. 
except to some extent in the context of the conflict around the Somali community in Kenya. 
which is associated with terrorism. Likewise. the significance of international causes of 
conflict in Serbia (and the former Yugoslavia) reflects the importance of international factors 
LQ6HUELD¶VSROLWLFDOGHYHORSPHQWVLQFH WKH ODWHV. which is hardly surprising taking into 
DFFRXQW<XJRVODYLD¶VEUHDNXSDQGVXEVHTXHQWµZDUVRIVXFFHVVLRQ¶. the NATO intervention. 
WKH ,&7< WULDOV RI 6HUELD¶V IRUPHU RIILFLDOV DQG DUP\ RIILcers. DQG .RVRYR¶V VHFHVVLRQ
However. the relationship between country context and media coverage is not a simple 1:1 
reflection. Further investigations are needed to explore the multiple transformations of 
meaning in public discourses that can tilt interpretations of political events toward 
unexpected directions.  
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Regime type and the stage of democratisation matter when it comes to media framing 
of political conflicts since countries that feature similar levels of democracy. or find 
themselves at similar points in democratisation. cluster together on several (but not all) 
relevant variables. At this point. however. additional research that would look at other 
sources is necessary to establish a direction of influence with regard to media reporting on 
conflicts in different phases of democratisation. It may well be that media framing also 
depends on if the breakdown of non-democratic regimes and (at least temporary) transition 
to democracy unfolded through pacting or revolutionary popular mobilisation.  
In addition. media reporting on democratisation conflicts also varied depending on 
conflict type. though less so than on country contexts. Our data show that elections. as a 
highly institutionalised type of conflict (though it also probably depends on regime 
type/situation). were covered somewhat differently than other conflict types. Further 
research. which draws on other sources. including the qualitative analysis of media content. 
interviews with journalists. civil society and political actors. as well as document analysis. is 
required to explain how exactly and why all these factors shape media coverage of 
democratisation conflicts. 
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